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BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT AND 
MOTION TO STRIKE 
11011 
If the Brief filed by County counsel herein is not vio-
lative of every norm of appellate brief writing, it may be 
only an inadvertence. The Brief is so disto:rited in its State-
ment not only of the facts but in argument as well, tllat 
it does not calculate a review of the ma:tJter on the record 
u1· within the rulings of the trial court. In its parts, Ap-
pellant's Brief contains an assortment of substantial ir-
regularities, improper argument, statements dehors the rec-
ol'd and misstatements of the record. For the purpose of 
2 
a Motion to Strike to be herein made, a few of the more 
prominent deviations are noted below. 
To begin with, the first three and one-half pages of 
counsel's Brief on ''Disposition in Lower Court" is a self. 
righteous and inaccurate argument, without record cita;tion 
whatsoever, on the events at the first trial leading to a mis- 1 
trial order of Judge Elton. 1 The great bulk of County 1 
counsel's Statement of Facts are not the facts of trial at 
all. but rather sheer argument. 2 The dirufribe is illustrated 
on page 9 of counsel's Statement where it is represented as 
fact that: 
"It is at least problematical, whether Defen. 
dant's highly imaginative appraisal ·would have 
taken the jury from a realistic valuation of the 
Hotel property, but for, a deliberately posed highly 
prejudicial question of defendant's counsel, asked 
of plaintiff's witness, Max Jensen, a:s to whether 
the county's valuation of the Colonial Hotel for tix 
purposes was not $130,000, accompanied by a flour· 
1Even if this soliloquy of counsel were remotely accurate (whic:h it is 
not) it cannot be considered in the appeal. Watkins v. Simonds. 14 
U. 2d 406, 385 P. 2d 154 (1963). Nevertheless, this invented argu 
ment and statement of Mr. Nielson thereafter serves as the basis for 
his Statement of Facts at page 9 and for Point II of his Brief with 
respect to the propriety of cross examination by the landowners as 
to the validity and consistency of income figures used by the County's 
experts. Such tactics are ill-fated in this Court. 
2Sec pages 6 and 7 of counsel's Brief wherein the owners' witnesses 
are said to have "ignored" previous experience on the condemned 
property and to have made "completely hypothetical projections of 
an imaginary operation". Appellant then proceeds on page 7 to use 
his own roncocted "hypothetical" resume of the landowners' expert» 
totally unsupported by the record. 
And on page 8 of counsel's Statement of Facts, a sale of prov 
erty excluded from evidence by Judge Elton is self-styled by counoel 
as comparable "probably more than any hotel anywhere in the 
u·nr/d". 
a 
ish of a yellow card which defendant's counsel 
handed to the Clerk for marking (R. 865, 831, 868 
and 874). Counsel of course kneiv that Judge Elton 
had ruled that such evidence was inadmissible at the 
previous trial."3 
Clear misstatements and misrepresentations of the rec-
ord are made at several stages of Appellant's Brief! 
3As noted in F. N. # 1, the record citation does not support in the 
slightest this vitriolic argument or that the owners' counsel "knew" 
of an earlier ruling in an earlier trial. Indeed, there is no such rec-
ord or ruling and Mr. Nielson's statement above is not only improper 
and unsupported argument, but it is a patently false misrepresenta-
tion. 
But this personal beratement of the landowners and their coun-
sel was typical of County counsel's approach throughout the trial. 
See counsel's closing argument to the jury where, without evi-
dential basis and in the face of continuing admonishment of the trial 
judge, the personal character of the owners was maligned and their 
honesty and integrity as citizens questioned, where the owners' coun-
sel was said to have intentionally retained unprofessional witnesses 
to be brought before "a new and inexperienced jury" and where it 
was said that the owners and their counsei were, by their evidence 
in the case, trying to "steal" from the jurors who were taxpayers 
(R. 809-813). 
•On page 8 of the Brief, it is claimed that the sale of the Upland 
Hotel was rejected by the trial court "in spite of testimony that the 
beneficiaries were acting at arms length". There is clearly nothmg 
in the record to even suggest that the beneficiaries were acting at all 
in the matter, much less acting at arms length (R. 672-674). Rather, 
the testimony strictly shows that the sale was from one party, as 
trustee, to himself, as trustee for another (R. 533-534). 
On page 9 of Appellant's Brief, County counsel indicates what 
the testimony of Owen Mc Ewan, former Salt Lake City Fireman 
would have been if permitted to testify and a record citation is given 
to that end. The record indicates no proffer as claimed by counsel 
as to McEwan and indeed, no part of the record remotely supports 
counsel's claim on the matter. Further, on page 6 of Appellant's 
Brief, it is stated that the County appraiser determined the income 
Producing potential of the condemned property by "comparative 
analysis" and record citation is given. The record, itself, including 
the noted citations, is quite to the contrary and indicates that the 
county expert did not make a comparative analysis of room rentals 
in other city hotels of similar class (R. 641, 1. 23-25). 
4 
These irregularities which ring throughout counsel's 
Brief are capped by his almost unique disclosure of a per-
sonal conversation held by him with jurors after return of 
the verdict. 5 
This Court has served notice time and again that it 
will not condone such a stuffing of the record by a party, 
that it will not consider a self-invented argument in the 
Statement of Facts and that it will, in its deliberations, dis-
regard misrepresentations and misstatements of the record 
such as have been above-noted in Appellant's Brief. Reliable 
Furniture Co. v_ Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Underwrit-
ers, Inc., 14 U. 2d 169, 380 P. 2d 135 (1963); Bwndley v. 
Lewis, 97 Utah 217, 92 P. 2d 338 (1939); Rule 75(p) (2)-
(2) (d), U.R.C.P. Each of such failings noted herein ar~ 
subject to a motion to strike as impertinent and scunilou' 
and Respondents so move this Court at this time to strike 
such matters from Appellant's Brief and from the Appeal. 
They should not be considered in the determination of thi; 
Appeal and Respondents should not be required to respond 
to the same_ 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
At no point does Appellant's Brief give any indication 
of the amount of 01· difference in the value testimony at 
trial. Nor dors Appellant c1•en suggest in its B1'1'ef t/11· 
anwunt of the jul'y verdict or its relationsl11>p to the rct/111 
evidence. Apparently, the assumption is that Appellant i< 
to prevail in this appeal nn the basis of abstract thecm 
5 "The jurors I talked to indicated that some o( the jury hdd out H 
a tinw for a verdict of $130.000 based on thP taxes ;,lone_ The sih1-1 
tion fairly sings with poetic justice" App. Br p. 2'.} 
5 
without regard to or in spite of the facts of trial. A synop-
sis of the proceedings in the lower court is accordingly in 
order. 
A mistrial (upon motion of the landowners) having 
been declared at the end of three days of trial, the case was 
reset and brought on for new trial on the issues of Just 
Compensation in June, 1967 (R. 66-67, 71-72). The opinion 
evidence of the parties on the market value of the Colonial 
Hotel property under condemnation was : 
Testimony of Loll for Landowners ------------$120,600.00 
(R. 484) 
Testimony of Roberts, one of the owners __ 130,000.00 
(R. 384) 
Testimony of Jensen for County ________ _______ 67,200.00 
(R. 677) 
The jury verdict of Just Compensation, returned after 
six and one-half days of trial, was a compromise of $97 ,-
500.00 ( R. 113). 
Plaintiff's Motion for a new trial for claimed errors of 
law was denied by Judge Elton on August 2, 1967 (R. 127). 
RELIEF SOUGHT BY APPELLANT ON APPEAL 
The County has appealed from the "Judgment of Aug-
ust 2, 1967" denying its Motion for a new trial." It requests 
herein a new trial on the issues of Just Compensation and 
further seeks an "advisory opinion" of sorts of this Court 
"I hat Plaintiff has appealed from a non-final order and not from the 
Judgment on the Verdict of June 21, 1967 (R. 120) has been made 
the subject of a separate motion to dismiss brought by Respondents 
hert•in. 
6 
on the use of the income approach in determining market 
value. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As noted above, the impropriety of Appellant's State-
ment of Facits, makes it impossible for Respondents to c.:on-
cur with or except to such Statement. Respondents will 
accordingly, set forth their own statement of evidentiary 
fads as follows : 
1. Condenined property. In March 1966, the Plaintiff 
condemned Defendants' property to make \Vay fo1· the con-
struction of the County Salt Palace ( R. 3). The property, 
long known as the Colonial Hotel, was situated on the north 
side of First South between West Temple and Fi1·st West 
Sti·eets in Salt Lake City ( R. 235). Constructed around 
1900 of sandstone foundation and two foot thick brick 
walls, the Hotel stood five stories high ( R. 244, 353). The 
ground floor served as a lobby and for business rentals 
(cleaning shop and barber shop) ( R. 248-249) . The upper 
floors consisted of some 24 apartment units and 70 hotel 
rooms (R. 248). The basement had been occupied for many 
years through the early 1960's by the Pagoda Restaurant 
(R. 246-247). 
2. Hotel Operrition. For many years, the patrons of 
the Hotel came primarily from the city's oriental commun-
ity, a fact which lent rental stability to the property (R. 
433-404). Many rent01·s resided in the Hotel on a perma-
nent basis (R. 249). In recent times, the Hotel averagrd 
about 75';'(, occupancy rate (R. 248-249). The property 
7 
ha<l been under an operating lease from the middle 1940's 
to the late 1950's between Frank E. Roberts (father of the 
other Defendants) as lessor, and Fuge Iwasaki (owner of 
the Pagoda) as lessee (R. 370-371). Thereafter Frank sold 
to his children and Fuge assigned his interest to one 
Takanaka in the late 1950's and early 1960's (R. 366-369). 
While there had been some adjustment of the base lease 
rental of the Hotel upward toward market rental value 
through the 1950's (R. 366-368), the lessee refused to pay 
an otherwise justified rental increase after 1963 on the 
Hotel (R. 365). The reason - the immirrency of the Salt 
Palace Project in the area had caused merchants, residents 
and Hotel patrons to vacate, move away and relocate, and 
the vacancy rate in the Hotel substantially increased after 
early 1963 (R. 393). The lease rental thus being paid was 
not fair market rental (R. 481). By 1966, room rentals 
were most marginal with all customary renters having gone 
elsewhere because of the Salt Palace acquisitions in the two 
city block section (R. 249). 
3. Maintenance. All floors of the Hotel were served 
by an automatic elevator, an unusual feature for an older-
class Hotel ( R. 355). A rewiring of the entire Hotel took 
place in 1961 and 1962. The building had recently under-
gone a complete outside painting, and the interior rooms 
had been refurbished from time to time ( R. 356-358) . 
4. Market conditions. The buying activities of the 
County and the L.D.S. Church (who combined their acqui-
' ~itions for the construction of the Salt Palace Project) had 
their affect on the open market in the area (R. 436-439). 
AftPr 1961, there were no sales whatsoever in the two block 
8 
region between in di vi dual buyers and sellers ( R. 442-443). 
Because of this condition and the impending· project, ten-
ants could not be held, property could not be sold in a nor-
mal and competitive environment and a depressed market 
resulted ( R. 439, 467, 519, 522). As a consequence, value 
icitnesses on both sides looked outside the two block zone 
of influence for mai·ket information in aniving at land 
value opinion (R. 469, 646). Mr. Loll for the landowners 
investigated and considered sales made to the L.D.S. Church 
(R. 465-466, 470), but determined that because of the sell-
er's relations with the Church, such transactions were not 
typical of market value (R. 466). Nor did the County 
value witness, Jensen, utilize any Church transactions. 
5. Cost replacrmrnt appmach. By its Brief, Appel-
lant would have us believe that the income approach to 
market value was the exclusive method used by the land-
owners. Quite to the contrary, the cost replacement ap-
proach (cost new less depreciation and obsolescence) was 
employed as a substantial index of market value under the 
owners' case. Mr. Loll concluded that the condemned prop-
erty, under the cost method, had a value of: 
Market value of land . _______________ .$ 44,000.00 
(by comparable sales # 1, 2, & 3) 
Value of building _____ ___ _ ______ _________ 103,000.00 
(cost new less depreciation) 
Total value _____ __ _ ___ ___ ____ __ __ .$14 7,::;oo.oo 
(R. 4h7-472, 482-48:1) 
Such value opinion of" Loll, i·eceived in evidence with-
11ut ohicction h,- the f'ount\·, \\'<18 some $26,700.00 less than 
that value determined by the income approach (R. 484) 7 
6. Income approach. This approach was adopted as 
an appraisement method by both sides. The Jiffer-
ence in the case lay in the rental income tested, the land-
owners having analyzed the ground floor and room rentals 
of the Hotel ( R. 453-455), and the County having relied on 
leasehold income (R. 612-617). For the landowners, Mr. 
Johns, MAI, and Mr. Loll testified that in determining mar-
ket value of a hotel, the income approach is the recognized 
method because of the following reasons : 
(a) A hotel is a special use property which because 
of wiring, plumbing, lay-out and design, is not 
adaptable to other general uses (R. 761, 502). 
The subject property had always been put to 
such special use (R. 250). 
(b) Because of the substantial difference in size, lo-
cation and type of each hotel in the city, there 
was a lack of genuine comparable S1a:les of hotel 
property (R. 449). No comparable hotel sales 
were introduced by either party. 
(c) That the buyer and seller in the market, in de-
termining a fair price for a hotel, rely substan-
tially on the income approach and income poten-
tial of the property (R. 279, 481-482). On this 
point, all witnesses were in agreement (R. 610, 
762-764). -'Loll stated that the cost replacement approach was less reliable than 
the income method on the subject property because of the difficulty 
in estimating the proper amount of depreciation to a building some 
70 years old (R. 445, 449). 
10 
Johns and Loll for the owners stated that it is basic 
appraisal practice in the evaluation of a hotel site to utilize 
the income approach by estimating and determining prob 
able room and ground floor rentals under typical and aver-
age management, deduct from such income estimate the 
expenses (taxes, insurance, maintenance, utilities) inciJent 
to the hotel, then deduct from the remaining rental income 
that portion allocable to a reasonable return upon the land 
investment, then capitalize the remaining income by a rate 
of return that would be expected by an ordinary and prud-
ent hotel buyer and seller ( R. 284-296, 453-465). Such cap-
italized figure, when added to the already determined land 
value, reveals market value of the entire property by the 
income approach (R. 296, 481-482, 484). Such method 
(sometimes called a rental operating statement) 1:s the typ· 
ical manner in which hotels are bought and sold in the 
market (R. 279, 338, 376). 
Mr. Loll for the condemnees utilized this appraise· 
ment method. In estimating room and ground floor rentals, 
he considered the actual experience and vacancy rate of the 
Colonial Hotel, (R. 451, 453-454), the depressed rental mar· 
ket in the area caused by the Salt Palace (R. 453, 481, 
559), the room rentals vis-a-vis vacancy rates of at least 
thee othe1· local hotels of comparable class to the Colonial 
(R. 475-480), and a rent pattern which, in the appraiser's 
judgment, represented sound and average management (R. 
452-455, 473-475). Expenses against such determined gTos0 
rent were similarly based on a substantial survey of other , 
hotels and actual operating expenses of the Colonial, typical 
management operation again being assumed (R. 475-480\ : 
11 
One of the condemnees, himself a leading hotel ex!)€rt in 
the City, testified as to average ground floor and room 
rentals and expenses for the Colonial (R. 377-379). 
While it was the fee interest in the Hotel which was 
condemned, the County witness, Jensen, chose to appraise 
only the leasehold rental as the sole basis for his income 
approach (R. 612-613, 714-715). Jensen also used the ac-
tual expenses of the leasehold agreement, including taxes 
and insurance (R. 612-613). He admitted that he made an 
initial and constant assumption throughout his appraisal 
that the actual leasehold rent equated fair market rent of 
the Colonial Hotel (R. 611-612, 613, 643, 835). On the 
other hand, the value witnesses for the owners did not rely 
on the actual leasehold rent as the sole ba:sis for value 
because: 
(a) The actual leasehold rental was not in their opin-
ions, fair market rental (R. 338, 345-346, 392, 
394, 481, 550) ; 
(b) Since the total property was being condemned 
and not just the leasehold interest, the rental 
from the whole property and not just a lease in-
terest, was the more relevant data to be con-
sidered (R. 299-300, 343-344, 481-482, 500, 764-
769); 
( c) The actual lessee, Takanaka, was sick and not a 
typical hotel operator (R. 488-489, 546); 
(d) The appraiser could not determine a fair lease-
hold rental until the rental of the entire Hotel 
was determined (R. 768-769). 
l~ 
The witnesses for both parties used practically the 
same capitalization rate of return, the owner's appraiser 
using a more conservative rate than that of the County 
(R. 462, 616). Mr. Jensen for the County, also appraised 
the Hotel on the basis of the cost replacement approach 
(R. 666). 
For the County, Mr. Kiepe admitted that the estimaterl 
rentals of a hotel, as depicted by the appraisal ap-
proaches of the landowners' witnesses, was a recogmzed 
and approved method for evaluating hotel properties, par-
ticularly, when it was determined by the appraiser that the 
leasehold rental was not fair market rent (R. 749). 
7. Cross examination of Jensen. On direct examina-
tion, the County witness, Jensen, testified that as a part of 
his income apprnach to value, he used the actual taxes pairl 
on the Colonial prope1-ty, $2500.00, as an expense deduction 
from his gross income figure (R. 612). On cross examina-
tion, the witness admitted that the taxes were out of b<1l-
ance anJ disproportionately high with respect to his gross 
income figure ( R. 831), but in further testimony he indi-
cated there was no imbalance (R. 831). Thereupon, Jensen 
was asked whether or not the $2500.00 tax bill as used by 
the witness was not, in fact, based upon a ma1·ket value 
estimate made by the State Tax Commission of $130,000.00 
(R. 831) .. Jensen answered he did not know (R. 8:11). Jrn-
sen was then requested to identify an exhibit (which wns 
not shm,·n to the jury) with i·espect to the taxes paid on 
the propel'ty, hut he \Yas unable to make the identification 
i R. R~2). Ther!eupon, the examination te1·minatecl (R. 8:3~). 
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8. Sale of Upland Hotel. On cross examination of the 
()wners' witness, Loll, County counsel asked by way of new 
evidence, if the Upland Hotel had not sold in 1961 for 
$97,600.00 (R. 532-533). Testimony of the sale was stricken 
by Judge Elton on redirect examination when it was shown 
that the sale was from Tracy Collins Bank, Trustee, to 
Tracy Collins Bank, as Trustee for arrother (R. 533-534. 
557-558, 570). The basis of the Elton ruling was that the 
transaction was a sale from a Bank to itself, and not an 
arms length transaction in the open market (R. 557-558, 
570, 674). Jensen for the County did not know whether 
the transaction was an open market, arms length, bona fide 
sale ( R. 67 4), and the trial court refused to permit the sale 
as comparable (R. 675). The County made no offer of 
proof whatsoever to show that the sale was made in the 
open market, that it was voluntary, that it was the result 
of normal bargaining and that it was otherwise an arms 
length transaction between a buyer and seller in the com-
petitive market (R. 675). 
9. Other w·itnesses called by County. W. Kiepe, an 
appraiser, was called by the County as another value wit-
ness. He testified categorically that he had never physioally 
inspected the Colonial Hotel and that he had not made an 
appraisal of the Hotel (R. 736, 751). The witness had ap-
praised other properties within the Salt Palace area (R. 
751). On the latter basis alone, County counsel asked Kiepe 
if he had an opinion as to the value of the real property of 
the Colonial Hotel (R. 751). The trial court sustained the 
1Jbjection to such question and to Kiepe's opinion, the foun-
dation for the ruling being that the witness, admittedly, 
had not appraised the condemned property and that such 
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appraisal was not to be conducted by "separating it piece-
meal", the land from the building (R. 752). County counsel 
made no of fer of proof as to what value, if any, the witness 
would have testified if so permitted (R. 753, 776). 
The County also called a Mr. McEwan, Fire Marshall 
at Utah University (R. 721). The witness went on the con-
demned premises one month after the date of condemna-
tion to make arrangements for fire-training courses to be 
held in the Hotel prior to demolition (R. 722). At the time 
of inspection, the Hotel was in the process of being dis-
mantled (R. 722). The witness was asked by County coun-
sel whether he observed the fire resistant qualities of the 
building and its conformance to fire regulations of the 
City and County (R. 722-723). An objection, based on 
relevancy and materiality, was sustained (R. 723). County 
counsel made no offer of proof as to what McEwan's testi· 
mony, if any, would have been (R. 724, cl seq.). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE VERDICT AND JUDGMENT STAND 
FULLY SUPPORTED UNDER THE ADMIT-
TEDLY COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF THE 
COST REPLACEMENT APPROACH TO MAR-
KET VALUE. 
One reading no further than the County's Brief in 
this appeal is left with the distinct impression that the 
evidence of trial, the verdict and judgment, all rest solely 
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on the income approach to market value. Throughout its 
Brief, the capitalization of income is the only value testi-
mony as to which Appellant makes any reference. Appel-
lant has failed by its Brief to advise this Court that, con-
trary to the intended impression, the landowners (indeed, 
both parties) submitted substantial testimony at trial of 
the market value of rthe Colonial Hotel, using as a basis of 
oalue the cost replacement approach. 
The owners' value witness testified at some length on 
the employment of the cost approach, the source of cost 
factors considered, the amount of accrued depreciation esti-
mated on the building, and the depreciated value of the 
building, $103,300.00, which when considered with and as 
a part of the real property, $44,000.00, indicated a total 
value of $147,300.00 (R. 448, 482-484). Such testimony, 
exceeding by more than $27,000.00 the value of the con-
demned property under the capitalization method of valua-
tion, was received without objection by the Appellant. And 
the appraiser for Appellant also testified to and used the 
cost replacement approach in arriving at his opinion (R. 
666-668). 
Although sometimes criticized as unsophisticated, the 
cost approach has been long recognized as a proper basis 
for market value in eminent domain, State Road Comm. v. 
Bingham Gas & Oil Co., 21 U. 2d 66, 440 P. 2d 260 (1968), 
In n Blackwell's Island Bridge, 198 N. Y. 84, 91 N. E. 278 
WJlO), and such method, itself, will adequately support 
a damage verdict and judgment. U.S. v. 2.4 Acres of Land, 
l:ix F. 2d 295 (7 CCA 1943); State Department of Public 
W:itks v. Styner, 72 P. 2d 699 at 702 (Ida. 1937); McGaw 
\'. Maym· of Baltimore, 102 Atl. 544 (Md. 1917). 
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Quite apart, therefore, from any evidence of the in. 
come approach in the case at hand, the verdict and judg-
ment is amply grounded on admittedly competent and sub-
str-.ntial evidence of market value via the cost replacement 
approach. And this Court will not order a new trial even 
were it assumed arguendo that errors of law were com-
mitted by the trial court on other issues. Baird v. Denver 
& R. G. R. Co .. 49 Utah 58 at 69, 162 Pac. 79 ( 1916); An· 
derson v. Thomas, 108 Utah 252, 159 P. 2d 142 (1945). As 
stated by this Court in Se ry v. Utah Fann Bureau Insur-
ance Co., 8 U. 2d 021, 334 P. 2d 554 ( 1959) : 
"No evidence attacked either the purchase or 
salvage price, and on such unassailed testimony, the 
court could have found the market value of the car 
to have been $200 after the mishap, with a result-
ant damage of up to $2,095. Having arrii·ed at the 
much lower figure of $1,446.92 in opplying one of 
two tests for determining dama,qes, ichich test 
proved ob,irctionrr.hle berause based on inadmissible 
evidence, shouuld not preclude plaintiff f10m rr-
couery where, on uncontroverted, admissible evi-
dence, cani•assed in the light of an equally ef fecticl' 
test for assess111ent of dama.r;es, plaintiff might 
me1 it a far greater award." 
The rationale of Sevy ·was further outlined by the 
Court in Hales v. PetP1'Son, 11 U. 2d 411, 360 P. 2d 822 
(1961). While there was no enor committed by Judge Elton 
in admitting evidence of the capitalization approach, as 
hereinafter discussed, the verdict and judgment are in an.v 
event fully sustain.ed ·within the substantial .framework of 
the cost apprnach testimony rt.!ciuced at trial. 
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POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RECEIVED 
THE TESTIMONY OF RESPONDENTS, AS 
WELL AS APPELLANT, ON THE CAPITAL-
IZATION APPROACH TO MARKET VALUE 
IN THE EVALUATION OF THE COLONIAL 
HOTEL. 
For Appellant to be heard in this Court, it has the 
burden of showing that error was committed by Judge 
Elton and that such error was prejudicial to the verdict 
and judgment: 
"* * * The verdict has been given some ad-
ditional verity by the rulings of the trial court on 
motions presented, including the motion for a new 
trial. When such a trial has been had, the presump-
tions are in favor of validity of the judgment en-
tered. This court is loathe to disturb it and will not 
do so unless the appellant meets its burden of show-
ing error and prejudice which deprived it of a fair 
trial. We are not persuaded that it did so here." 
Lemmon v. D. & R. G. W. R. Co., 9 U. 2d 195, 341 
P. 2d 215 (1959). 
This Court has consistently held the "prejudice" in the 
appeal sense requires proof that the verdict would, in all 
probability, have been different and in favor of Appellant 
but for the alleged error. Startin v. Madsen, 120 Utah 631, 
237 P. 2d 834 ( 1951). Contrary to this mandate, the 
County has shown neither error nor prejudice in this ap-
peal. With respect to the only genuine point raised by it, 
to-wit, the propriety of using the capitalization approach 
in evaluating the Colonial Hotel, the authorities and prece-
dent of this Court fully affirm the trial court ruling. 
l~ 
1. The income approach is admissible in the market 
value determination in eminent domain, particularly as to 
special purpose properties. 
Point I of the County's Brief is devoted to a general 
disparagement of the income or capitalization approach in 
condemnation. Indeed, its censure of the income method 
and the dependency upon the Sackman speech suggests 
that Appellant's claim is tha1t the capitalization approach 
is not admissible at all in eminent domain "in the absence 
of a constitutional provision or statute requiring a differ-
ent rule". App. Br. p. 18. At the least, Appellant's argu-
ment assumes that the issue of income and income approach 
has never before been raised in this Court, since it cite6 no 
Utah precedent at all. 
Not only does Appellant's argument fail to focus on 
the motivations and plain realities of the hotel market 
(which in this case indicate thait income potential is thr 
lea,ding characteristic in the eyes of the hotel buyer and 
seller) , but it fails to heed the admonition of this Court as 
to the relevant factors which are and may be taken into 
account in determining market value.R But more specific-
ally, Appellant's argument on the income approach ignores 
the plain holding in the recent ca:se of State Road Comm. 
v. Bingham Gas & Oil Co., 21 U. 2d 66, 440 P. 2d 260 
(1968) wherein this Court expressly gave its approval of 
the use of the income approach in the condemnation of a 
special purpose property, a service station and cafe. In 
Binaham. in proving the value of the condemned premises, 
•Weber Basin Conserv. nist. v. Ward, IO U. 2d 29, 347 P. 2d 862 
(1959). 
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the owner relied (in addition to the cost replacement ap-
proach), upon the capitalization of the net lease and gallon-
age pumped at the station. The condemnor made the same 
argument as Appellant does herein - that the income ap-
proach was not admissible in arriving at market value and 
that in all events, gallonage was attributable to business 
profits and management and could not be properly capital-
ized to determine value. This Court, in an undivided opin-
ion, rejected both arguments. Speaking through Justice 
Tuckett, it was held : 
"In general, appraisers of real estate use three 
different approaches for the determination to mar-
ket value; these are: (1) the market data approach 
or consideration of comparable sales; (2) the re-
production of cost at the time of taking, less de-
preciation; and ( 3) the income approach or capital-
ization of projected income. 
''* * * The owner's appraisers used the 
cost approach as well as the capitalization approach 
in determining the market value. The cost approach 
indicated a market value of the property taken 
equal to or in excess of the value based upon capi-
talization. 
"It would seem to us that in view of the special 
use to which the property had been put prior to 
taking and its location the most reasonable and 
practicable method the trial court could use in its 
determination of value was the capitalizaition ap-
proach." 
With the authorities referred to therein in support of 
the holding, Bingham is one of the leading decisions in the 
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country on the use of the income approach in eminent do-
main. When the highest and best use of the property is a 
"special use" for which its income potential is a prime con-
siderntion in the market place, Bingham is applicable. 
2. The hotel use of the subject property is special 
within the "Bingham" definition. 
That a hotel is a special purpose or use of property 
should prnvoke no debate, not even from Appellant. Wit-
nesses on both sides at trial agreed as to the special and 
unordinary use. Unlike a typical building, a hotel is not 
amenable to ready conversion to garden variety business 
uses. Its floor plan, ·wiring-, plumbing and bathroom sys-
tems require adherence to the hotel use. M cMichaels' Ap-
prnisiny Manual, Prentice Hall, (4th Ed.) 1959 pp. 248· 
249. ln the sale of a hotel, the willing and informed buyer 
and selle1· will, therefore, take into consideration those 
factors which have particular relevancy to the special hotel 
purpose, and such factors may not have any relationship 
to those facto1·s which involve typical business property. 
The key facto1· in the purchase and appraisal of a hotel 
prope1ty is its income potential: 
"Hotel properties are bought and sold on the 
ma1·ket and new hotels are constructed and placed 
in O})e1·ation, yet in both instances the p1·imary pur-
pose is the producing of net income." McMicharl's 
Appraisinr; Manual, supra p. 248. 
3. Income approach of Respondents was fully sup-
ported and properly received by Judge Elton. 
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In determining whether Judge Elton erred, as charged 
by the County, in permitting the capitalization of hotel 
rentals, the threshold statement of this Court in Weber 
Basin Conserv. Dist. v. Ward, 10 U. 2d 29, 347 P. 2d 862 
( 1959) is the guideline : 
"We are in accord with what appears to be the 
better view, adopted by the triaI court, that the 
condemnee is entitled to the fair market value of his 
property at the time of the service of summons in 
the condemnation proceeJings as provided by stat-
ute; and that all factors bearing upon such value 
that any prudent purchaser would take into account 
nt that time should be gi11en consideration, includ 
ing any potential development in the area reason-
ably to be expected." 
Although Appellant might like us to believe other-
wise, it is unable to advocate the total excision of the in-
come approach to value in this case. The reason - because 
the County itself used the method at trial. In fact, most 
of its testimony hinged upon the income method. So what 
Appellant is forced to argue is that all other analyses of 
income of the property, other than that specifically adopted 
by Appellant, are improper. And that is just what it claims 
in this appeal.9 
The facts are that both parties relied at least in part 
upon the income approach to market value. The Respon-
dents relied upon the reasonable rental from rooms and 
ground floor (exclusive of concessions, restaurants or 
strictly business income) as its basis for the approach. The 
Appellant chose to use a leasehold rental as its income 
"SeB App. Br. p. 19. 
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basis, although it was the fee estate in the property which 
had been condemned. Respondents' value witnesses clearly 
dcnird that leasehold rental in the matter constituted fair 
market rrntal. While both of the income methods thus 
used by the pa1ties have their proper place in the capitali-
zation approach of special purpose properties, the appraisal 
authorities leave no doubt that the method of the landown-
ers is by far preferred in the evaluation of a hotel. In the 
leading appraisal treatise, Encyclopedia of Real Estate 
Appraisinu, (ReYised and Enla1·ge<l) Friedman, Prentice-
Hall ( 1968) p. 619, it is stated that with respect to the 
appraisal of a hotel : 
''The appraiser gives consideration to reproduc-
tion cost less depreciation, and to comparison with 
sales of similar hotels, but he is especially concerned 
wdh the analysis and capitalization of probable 
future operating income or of rental income under 
a lease. Problems peculiar to the particular hotel 
or type of hotel under appraisal arise continually. 
"* '' * Capitalization of net income from 
actual operation of the hotel in the past may or may 
not be a fair indication of its value. After careful 
study of the hotel in its environment, the appraiser 
estimates the net income that the property should 
produce under 'normally' efficient management. If 
the actual net income produced by the operation in 
the past is well below that which reasonably may be 
anticipated for the future, the appraiser may find 
that the past record was the result of inefficient or 
indifferent management; he may adjust his valua-
tion upward if not to the valuation based on income 
from normally efficient management." 
The expert testimony of this trial concurred in the 
Encyclopedia statement. And the reasonable rental pro-
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duction of the Colonial Hotel, was determined by Respon-
dents' witnesses only after an exacting study of past ren-
tals, occupancy rates, net income, eJ..'J)enses, and typical 
management of the Colonial Hotel and other competing 
hotels. 
The expert testimony shows that if these owners had, 
m fact, sold their property on the open market to a private 
buyer, the capitalization approach which Respondents pur-
sued at trial, would have been used by that private buyer 
ancl seller in determining a fair sales price. Should they, 
Hs the County contends, be foreclosed from utilizing that 
vrry evaluation approach to market value because their 
property was involuntarily placed in the teeth of a con-
'1emnation suit? The answer has to be no, not without do-
ing violence to the cardinal definition of market va:lue10 
and the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. 
The answer is as Judge Elton found it to be, that such in-
tome rentals and capitalization approach of the Colonial 
Hotel is admissible in evidence because it is the chief and 
most fundamental element considered by the buyer and 
seller in the hotel market. 
4. The authorities fully sustain Judge Elton's approval 
of the capitalization approach of Respondents herein. 
The precedent of this Court, under the Bingham de-
cision and a wealth of authorities otherwise, affirms the 
discretionary ruling of the trial court. Public Market of 
P0rtland v. City of Portland, 170 P. 2d 586 (Ore. 1946); 
f'o1tnty of Maricopa v. Shell Oil Co., 84 Ariz. 325, 327 P. 2d 
"'State Road Comm. v. Hansen, 14 U. 2d 305, 383 P. 2d 917 (1963). 
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1005 (1958). Nichols on Eminent Domain, VoiJ. 4, p. 113 
(3rd Ed.). 
In U. S. v. Eden Memorial Park Assoc., 350 F. 2d 933 
(9 Cir. 1965), unimproved cemetery property was con-
demned by the Government for construction of a freeway. 
The owners' witnesses, over objection, utilized the capitali-
zation approach on projected income of the cemetery in ar-
riving at market value. In giving its approval to the cap-
italization method under the particular circumstances, the 
Ninth Circuit held: 
"In seeking to establish the value of the land 
taken, Eden relied upon evidence of the capitaliza-
tion of projected income, or as it is sometimes re-
ferred to 'the income approach'. The Government 
assigns the introduction of this evidence as error. 
"* * * 'Appraisers commonly think of val-
ue in three ways: 
1. The current cost of reproducing a property less 
depreciation from all sources, that is, deterioration 
and functional and economic obsolescence. 
2. The value which the property's net earning 
power will support, based upon a capitalization of 
net income. 
3. The value indicated by recent sales of compara-
ble properties in the market. 
"* * * We conclude the Court properly ad-
mitted the evidence as to capitalization of income to 
establish the value of the property taken." 
Further authority for the use of income (other than 
leasehold rentals) as a criteria of market value is found in 
Sill Corp. v. U.S., 343 F. 2<l 411 (10 Cir. 1965). Therein, 
the Government condemned the owner's interest in a Wher-
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ry Housing Project. While the parties agreed as they did 
on the Colonial Hotel, that the income approach was compe-
tent, the owner claimed that it was entitled to capitalize 
income without expenses because of the relevancy of the 
factor in the market for that type of property. The Tenth 
Circuit writing through Murrah, C. J., agreed with the 
owner and sustained the verdict: 
"We know, of course, that the law is not 
wedded to any particular formula or method for 
determining fair market value as the measure of 
just compensation. It may be based upon compara-
ble sales, reproduction costs, capitalization of net 
income, or an interaction of these determinants. 
The parties agreed in this case that the capitaliza-
tion of income is the most satisfactory method." 
In County of Maricopa v. Shell Oil Co., supra, the 
Arizona Supreme Court approved the capitalization of 
gmss income of a service station in arriving a:t market 
value because the buyer, in purchasing station sites, com-
monly considers such facior. While the Sill and Shell Oil 
<lecisions extend quite beyond the evidence and rulings of 
.Judge Elton herein,11 they are significant in this appeal 
because they reflect the extent to which highly respected 
courts have gone in approving capitalization of income 
estimates where such factor was a material element of 
1·ni11e in thr market. 
In State of Arizona v. Wilson, 420 P. 2d 992 (Ariz. 
1%7), a guest ranch was partially condemned for freeway 
'
1Respondents herein did not in any way capitalize gross income into 
value. Rather, it was based strictly on net income, after expenses, 
of determined room and ground floor rental. 
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usage. The owner predicated severance damage to remain. 
ing property on the basis of a reduction in the gross in-
come of the property. The trial court permited the evi-
dence over objection under a limited instruction that while 
the evidence could not be used to show "loss of profit to 1 
a business", it could be admitted as an element in determ. 
ining the value of the condemned property before and after 
the taking. On appeal, the Arizona Court affirmed the 
holding and in so doing, pointed out the distinction between 
the loss of profits, per se, and property income. The latter 
is admissible where it is a relevant market factor: 
"It seems to be the general law that in a con· 
demnation action evidence of profits derived from 
a business conducted on the property is too specu- ' 
laJtive or uncertain to be considered as a basis for 
computing or ascertaining market value of prop-
erty. However, the courts have consistently dis-
tinguished between profits from a business and in-
come from the real property itself, which is con-
sidered to have relevancy as to the market value of 
the land. Though this distinction has almost uni· 
versal acceptance, the courts have had difficulty in 
determining when income arises from a 'business' as 
opposed to that derived from the intrinsic nature of 
the property itself." 
In approving capitalization of gross income, the Ari-
zona Court went on to emphasize the inherent discretion 
placed in the trial court in passing on this type of evidence: 
"In drawing a dividing line between the two 
types of income involved, we believe that consider· 
able room for the discretion of the trial court must 
be allowed. We see sufficient relationship between 
the income from a guest ranch and the value of the 
real property used as that guest ranch so that we do 
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not consider the admission of the evidence in ques-
tion to be an abuse of discretion." 
Two cases involving the condemnation of hotels are 
noteworthy. Regents of University of Minnesota v. Irwin, 
57 N. W. 2d 625 (Minn. 1953) and U. S. v. 6.28 Acres of 
Land, 64 F. Supp. 117 (Ga. 1946). In Irwin, the Minne-
sota Supreme Court upheld the capitalization of room ren-
tals in the condemnation of a large apartment house and 
rejected the claim of the Regents that such constituted 
evidence of profits: 
"It seems to us that because of the apparent de-
mand for rental space in that particular location, 
the rentals received from the rooms available for 
rental purposes, with other elements would neces-
sarily affect values placed on the entire property 
and would be considered by prospective purchasers 
in estimating the market value of the premises. 
"* * * In determining the value of these 
respective properties, particularly where income 
was being considered, it seems to us that both the 
buyer and the seller would consider these facts and 
the income derived from each property in determin-
ing the market value." 
And in U. S. v. 6.28 Acres of Land, supra, value wit-
nesses in appraising a condemned hotel, relied on past and 
estimated earnings of the hotel in arriving at market value. 
The Federal Court held that such evidence was admissible 
because it would have been taken into account by a buyer 
and seller in negotiations: 
''Both parties having relied upon actual income 
as one of the elements to be considered in the de-
termination of the issue of just compensation, and 
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having submitited evidence that the highest and best 
use for the property was as a hotel, the testimony 
of earnings was properly admitted." 
All of the authorities cited herein are in full accord 
with the holding of this Com1t in the Bingham Gas and 
Weber Basin v. Ward decisions and sustain the rulings of 
Judge Elton at trial. They do not hold and we would not 
claim that income evidence or the income approach is ap-
plicable in every eminent domain suit. Quite to the con-
trary, it is not. But when, as in this case, the Court is in-
volved with the valuation of a special purpose property 
which has as its leading and most potent value element, the 
determined income potential to be derived from a typical 
operation of the property, the rationale of Bingham Gas 
and the authorities herein cited are highly relevant and 
critical to the market value Jetermination. To hold other-
wise, would be to ignore a plain factor which the buyer and 
seller would consider in a private sale of the property. The 
Government will not be permitted to deny the seller-owner 
fair consideration of that factor because it has resorted to 
condemnation as a vehicle to acquire the property. 
5. The argument of Appellant is without merit and 
citations are of no precedent. 
The County's argument on the capitalization approach 
consists of three factions ( 1) that the capitalization method 
followed by Respondents improperly utilized personal prop-
erty of a hotel business, (2) that such income constituted 
loss of profits from a business, and (3) that such testimony 
was conjectural. Appellant's main reliance is on a 1965 
speech delivered by J. Sackman, a condemnor-attorney from 
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the State of New York. 12 Appellant has not cited a single 
hotf'l case in its Brief to suppo~ its position. And the Sack-
man article is largely irrelevant, being devoted to those case 
citations wherein the landowner has hypothecaJted a build-
ing on what, in fact, is unimproved land and then attempts 
to capitalize an estimated income from the theoretical 
building. Such attempts are uniformly rejeoted by the 
Courts and are not herein involved whatsoever. 
As to claim ( 1), Appellant is in error on the facts. The 
facts are that the value witnesses of Respondents did prop-
erly deduct personal property in the Hotel from the cap-
italized income. The Hotel furnishings of the Colonial, ad-
mittedly, were not fixtures under the definition of this 
Court in Statr Road Comm. v. Papanikolas, 19 U. 2d 153, 
427 P. 2d 749 (1967), and were not appraised as part of 
the just compensation a\rnrd. So far as the capi1Jalization 
apprnach to market value is concerned, Respondents' wi't-
ne,ses took out of the expenses from gross income, a return 
and deJH'eciation attributable to personalty (R. 369, 456-
,1S9). Appellant in its Brief has not referred the Court 
to a scintilla of evidence to indicate the contrary.13 It is 
its \Ju rel en to do so. 
As to claim (2), no testimony was offered by Respon-
dents 01· received that even vaguely resembled loss of prof-
1 This speech remains unpublished by anyone. It was offered for pub-
lication to and declined by the University of Utah Law Review in 
1%6. 
' County counsel should take a look at its own income evidence as to 
P<>rsonalty since its witness, Jensen, did not reflect in his rental in-
come rakulations the fact that the landlord and not the lessee 
hc·rein, owned the Hotel furnishings. Because the lessee would typ-
ically supply his own furnishin!{s. the same should be reflected in 
thr lt>asehold rental normally payable. Nor did Jensen, in his gross 
'"Ill multiplier. consider such personalty. 
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its. If the evidence had been directed at business loss, the 
damage testimony and claims of Respondents would have 
inordinately exceeded the actual evidence at trial. Respon-
dents' use of hotel rentals and capitalization approach was 
proffered as a factor which the thinking buyer and seller 
would weigh, and was no more a loss of business profits 
than the evidence in income approach in Bingham Gas, or 
the testimony in State of Arizona v. Wilson, supra, Regents 
of Uni1;. of Minn. v. Irwin, supra, U. S. v. Eden Memorial 
Park Assoc. supra, and the other decisions cited herein 
wherein similar claims of profit and business loss were re-
jected. Appellant has not cited one decision involving 
special purpose property where such evidence was de-
termined as profit loss, per se, and hence inadmissible. The 
County's argument on this point is a hoax, a worn--0ut 
cliche made in the hope that somehow the words "loss of 
profits", per se, will strike a magic chord resulting in a 
new trial for Appellant. The answer is tha:t the realities 
of the market place do not operate that way and neither 
does the controlling law. Weber Basin Conserv. Dis. v. 
Wa.rd, supra. 
As to claim (3) of Appellant (that the testimony of 
Respondents was conjectural and not based upon "realty 
in the market place") a dispassionate review of the evi-
dence quickly reveals its fallacy. Past operation of the 
Colonial and operation of other hotels of similar class were 
reviewed in detail by the value witnesses of Respondents and 
subjected to cross-examination by Appellant. And Judge 
Elton at several points, charged the jury that just compen-
sation was not to be based on conjecture. The capitaliza-
tion evidence being fully admissible, the issue of its weight 
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and credibility was properly one for the jury, which 
this Court will not disturb. State Road Comm. v. Stanger, 
21 U. 2d ______ , 442 P. 2d 941 (1968); Weber Basin Conserv. 
Dist. V. Nelson, 11 U. 2d 253, 358 P. 2d 81 (1960). 
6. Appellant's witness admitted and agreed with Re· 
spondents that the income approach of Respondents was a 
recognized and proper evaluation method. 
Contrary to the lament of Appellant herein, the County 
witness, W. Kiepe, testified that in the appraisal of a hotel, 
capitalization of net rentals is an important market con-
sideration and recognized appraisal method, particularly 
when "the appraiser found thait the contraot rent was 
either above or below what could reasonably be expected 
in the market" (R. 750, 774). The value witnesses of Re-
spondents had already in their appraisements, met the con-
dition of Kiepe's statement, i. e., both found that contract 
rental was substantially below the economic or fair market 
rental of the Colonial Hotel. 
7. Appellant, itself, used as its final basis of market 
value the "gross rent multiplier". 
The County has neglected in its Brief to inform the 
Court that in its final correlation of market value opinion, 
its witness, Jensen, used the gross rent multiplier as the 
sule basis of value (R. 677-678). Under this method, 
the determined gross income, without consideration of ex-
µenses, is multiplied by a factor which the appraiser esti-
mates from the gross income of other properties. The 
caveat anJ danger attached to such method is quickly ap-
llctl'ent - neither the gross income or the multiplication 
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factor used reflect differences in the studied properties for 
age, size, location, state of repair, or available facilities. 
The gross rent multiplier is widely condemned in ap-
praising circles as inaccurate and unanalytical. The Valuar 
tion of Estate, A. A. Ring, Prentice Hall (1965) pp. 174-
176. Yet the County used this approach as its major and 
ultimate test of value of the Colonial Hotel herein. It should 
not be heard to complain of the far more relial11e, 
authoritative and proven capitalization method employed 
by Respondents. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PER-
MITTING CROSS EXAMINATION OF THE 
COUNTY WITNESS JENSEN, ON ASSESSED 
VALUE OF AND TAXES PAID ON THE 
COLONIAL HOTEL. 
1. Cross examination was pursued to impeach and 
test the weight and credibility of the opinion of the Coun-
ty's expert, and not to introduce substantive evidence of 
market value. 
The importance of the breadth of cross-examination 
was emphasized by this Court in State v. Peek, 1 U. 2d 263, 
265 P. 2d 630 (1953): 
"There is no other instrument so well adapted 
to discovery of the truth as cross-examination, and 
as long as it tends to disclose the truth it should 
never be curlm"led or l1:mited. Any inquiry should 
be allowed which an individual about to buy would 
fed it in hfr: interest to make." 
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Other authorities echo the Peek statement anj the 
broad discretion ves·ted in the trial court in ruling on such 
matters: 
"The trial court has a particularly large discre-
tion in allowing cross-examination of an expert wit-
ness as to value, because the object of such exam-
ination is principally to determine the credibility of 
the witness and whether or nat he has taken into 
consideration all the elements of value in arriving 
at his conclusion." 31 Am. Jur. 2d 557, Expert Evi-
dence §51. 
To the same effect is Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. III, 
p. 630 §992 (3rd Ed.), 5 Nichols on Eminent Domain, 188 
§18.45 (2) (3rd Ed.). 
County counsel claims by Point II of its Brief, that 
Judge Elton erred in permitting cross-examination of the 
County witness, Jensen, as to the taxes paid and the as-
sessed and appraised value for tax purposes of the Colonial 
Hotel. The only authorities cited by Appellant for the 
claim a1·e those wherein a party has attempted to introduce 
evidence of assessed and appraised taxation figures for the 
purpose of proving substantive market value and are not 
in point here. 
The simple facts confronting the County's argument 
on this issue are these: 
(a) Appellant's witness, Jensen, on direct ex-
amination, in testifying as to market value by the in-
come approach, specifically used the actual lease in-
come as his gToss income, and also usPd the actual real 
p1 operty taxes of $2.500.00 paid by Respondent as an 
expense deduction from gross income (Ex. P-13). 
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(b) Said taxes under Jensen's own figures on 
direct examination constituted better than 30% of his 
gross income estimaJte. Asked if the ratio of taxes 
vis-a-vis his calculation of rental income was not out 
of line, the witness first said "yes" and then on cross. 
examination indicated "no" that they were in line. 
(c) At that point, Jensen was asked if the taxes 
which he had used in his appraisal were not based on 
an appraisement and assessment of $130,000.00.14 The 
witness answered he did not know whether such was 
true. He then asked if he had seen the State Tax Com-
mission evaluation schedule of the Hotel, and he an-
swered, "no". Cross-examination on the subject there-
upon terminated. 
( d) County counsel had full opportunity on re· 
direct examination to show the taxes were in line with 
rthe gross income figures of Jensen, as Jensen claimed, 
or to move for a mistrial if he felt that prejudicial 
error had developed. He did neither. 
Jensen had voluntarily raised the issue of taxes on his 
examination in chief. It was crystal clear thereunder that 
a serious imbalance existed between Jensen's gross income 
figures and taxes. Either income was too low (if the taxes 
were accurate) or the taxes were more than twice as high 
as they should have been (if his income figures were fair 
141t should be noted that the County in this case has never denied 
either the truth of this statement or that these owners were, in fart. 
paying real property taxes on the Hotel based on assessed and ap· 
praised valuation of $130,000.00 Yet Jensen's opinion of market 
vali1e under the income approach was $67,200.00 or about Vi of the 
value upon which taxes were paid. 
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market rental). An adjustment of either to bring gross 
income and taxes into balance would have, in any event, 
meant a very substantial increase in the market value of 
the Hotel under Jensen's own appraisal. Having introduced 
such testimony itself, Appellant claims now that cross-ex-
amination was not available to Respondents to get at the 
root rancer of this inconsistency. 
As reflected by the attitude of the trial judge, cross-
examination on the appraised and assessed tax values was 
not put to .Jensen to introduce substantive evidence on 
market value. Rather, it was to test on cross-examination 
the reliability and credibility of this expert's opinion whidh 
had been developed on direct examination. 
2. The precedent overwhelmingly supports cross-ex-
a1;t;nation as a matter of right of tax appraisements under 
th cse facts. 
In the condemnation case of Central Pacific Ry. Co. v. 
Feldman, 92 Pac. 849 (Cal. 1907), the California Supreme 
Court passed on the identical issue herein in the following 
manner: 
"The same witness, Feldman, having testifiel 
on direct examination that in his opinion the prop-
erty was worth $30,000, was asked on cross-exam-
ination whether he did not know that it had been 
in recent years assessed for taxation at amounts 
varying from $1,925 to $2,525. Objections to ques-
tions of this character were rightly overruled. Wh1'.le 
the assessed value of property is not admissible as 
original evidence of its market value, a witness who 
has testified as an expert may properly, on cross-
examination be asked what is his knowledge re-
gardfog such assessment for the purpose of testing 
the value of his opinion." 
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Feldman was reaffirmed by the California Court ir 
City of Los Angeles v. Deacon, et al., 7 P. 2J 378 (Ca! 
1932) wherein it was said in a condemnation case: 
"On cross-examination, however, questions ma1 
be asked about these various matters: Assessmer;. 
and probate appraisals (citing authorities)." 
In City of Detroit v. Ehinger, et al., 316 ~Iich. 360, ~.·. 
N. \V. 2d 516 ( 1947), the trial court refused to pennit th< 
property owner to show on cross-€xamination, the asssess&J 
valuation of the property for the current year made by tht 
City on the condemned property. The )Iichigan Suprem' 
Court reYerseci. holding the refusal to be preJ udicial error. 
The Court ruled : 
"The City fhed a culTent 19-!5 as.sessic:<l \"alua· 
tion for parcel X ('. 15 c.S the O~i.S :0:1r 0Jbtaining tax 
money for gove1"11Illent«d purp<:ises. Tr.e city no;' 
seeks t\• obtain ti1e land ic._'<:i:. : 1:·r p 1J~'.i2 purpose, 
lrhil< :i;t J9-!5 a."·~·:-~B~,.-i .·c:.::,.a .. ,~n .:-,.,._,. );,jf drt 1 1 
111l11t !cit}; _iirwi.-~) .. {;_f .'rzir "'>-~~:_..~ . ll·~·,,; in thi.0 
co11do11 nation ca~c :·~ ,_f1.~·">: J-.c. ·1: n. ····:1:> · :'.~! 1_,~ 1.uing 
01l tht· !·S~'.lt. a~ ~,J >.·r..a": '..~ ~~-:- 19-!-5 i('.__· · 1 '!·.r ,.k~ t ~'(l/}/( 
or tlzt prt1p,-.•·t;1. n·~>·n ').:.,:, . .. ,. : ~. :1 ~~J ·~.:.: _ l;_rlrznfs in 
t<.ll!dt n: ~?(~t!·1..1n _:..P·~~,_~-:-"'.·._:·· .. : ...... "B. ~;.:- ·--=-~·-~:-~·~'=- --~- _·(duation 
r<)'' ~J.;t' l .. '.: • ·t ':~ >-::-,_~ ~- _:< .. :._·:.: ~ > ~~-:- _·:·-_, ._-.r. ~hf prop-
t·,·~-, '.·': .;.~~~-·._-,: '.~ _··: ~;::· ·: .. :-·. ·:· _-- ._ .. ~: -:·_1;-,!(-'i.3i011 
l~\.~l~ '= .. '~ •:""· ..... R::-:"...:s....:..: :.~ ~.-= .. :.:::..:: _-,._;, ;~-,~ .. ~·=· \rhen 
\. ... ~-ft'!"t\.i ~'Y :~:e \.:~:·;:..:.::.:.:.~_:-3 ~.--=.-_:..s ;=-~~·..:::~:_-:..: ti: 1 them 
;\!hi. tlct' ;!,\\·:::·,-'. ::: :::-.:.;:. ,;'.S,;- :-... ::..:.;;: °::-:; :::::-: .:;..;;: :ic-." 
· :· _.\ppel· 
::.- Brie:' 
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and claimed at trial that the Hotel was worth less than half 
of the basis of the tax assessment and value. Apart from 
the l"ight of cross-examination because of the income ap-
proath used by Jensen in this case, Ehinger holds that such 
n,idencc was properly received in evidence as an admission 
,1gainst interest. 
And in PCLckage Machinery Co. v. Commonwealth, 188 
r;, E. 2d 871 (Mass. 1963), the Massachusetts Supreme 
Court held in an eminent domain suit that questions run-
ning to tax evaluation and assessment were proper on 
cross-examination to tesit the credibility of the expert: 
·'There was no error. The questiorus answered 
by the expert and the assessor were asked for the 
purpose of testing the valuation placed by the ex-
pert on the land taken, and the evidence was thus 
admissible even though it could not be received as 
evidence of the fair market value of that land. (Cit-
ing authorities.)" 
.T udge Elton in no way erred in permitting cross-ex-
amination of this most important element of Jensen's opin-
irm, lrnlc>ed, it would have been prejudicial error if Re-
sp()11dents had not been allowed to so cross-examine. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR ON THE 
LOLL TESTIIvIONY WITH RESPECT TO HIS 
CON~ll>ERATION OF THE LDS CHURCH 
TRANSACTIONS. 
TiiP rc>maining issues disrnssed by Appellant in Points 
111, l \', ;rnd \' of its B1·ief arc makeweight. In Ill, Appel-
I 1;1 ;11!..' 11('< tl1:1l R(•sponrlents' pxpe1t, Loll, "aitificially ex-
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eluded from his appraisal * * * the numerous pur-
chases of the LDS Church", and ergo, that Loll's opinion 
should have been totally rejected by Judge Elton. For such 
esoteric claim, the County cites an Illinois decision15 where-
in an expert based his opinion on severance damage in a 
power line condemnation on "the feelings of the commun-
ity", possible danger of wire breakage and other items, 
which under Illinois law, are all non-compensable elements 
of damage. Even if Appellant were otherwise correct on 
the facts and the law herein (which it is not), one has to 
torture the reasoning process to relate the Illinois case to 
the case at hand. 
The Appellant has misstated the fact of the matter. 
Loll did not testify that he excluded the Church sales from 
his value conclusions. To the contrary, he testified that 
he did consider such sales but found in such consideration 
that their circumstances did not reflect open, arms-length 
transactions10 ( R. 439, 466). Accordingly, Loll investigated 
land sales in another downtown area. And it turns out 
that the County witness, Jensen, did the same as Loll did. 
Jensen did not use one Church sale in determining land 
value, although he probably considered and investigated 
the same. In fact, he went to the same area as Loll did for 
his comparable land information. Under the County's 
theory herein, the Jensen testimony should likewise be re· 
jected for failure to consider the Church transactions. 
tSCentral Illinois Light Co. v. Nierstheimer, 185 N. E. 2d 841 (1962). 
H/J'here had been but one sale between a private buyer and seller in 
the two hlnck, 20 acre Salt Palace area in the five years before the 
date of condemnation (R. 439-443). Loll found this to be an un-
common market occurrence in rdation to other similar areas. Church 
intluence in the sales Vvas also present (R. 437-439, 466). 
The County is as well wrong on the applicable law. 
The expert witness is not required, as a matter of lega:l 
competency, to consider and weigh ea~h and every sale as 
against all others, as though in a crucible. This Court has 
left no doubt as to its repudiation of any such doctrine. 
8.L.C. Board of Education v. Bothwell & Swaner, 16 U. 2d 
341, 400 P. 2d 568 (1965) . The rule of this Court is that 
the claimed failure, if any, of a qualified witness to give 
significance to a particular sale or sales raised by the ad-
versary goes to the weight of the expert's opinion and not 
to its competency or admissibility. State Road Comm. v. 
Peterson, 12 U. 2d 317, 366 P. 2d 76 (1961). 
The trial court was entirely correct in denying the 
Appellant's motion to exclude the Loll testimony. 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT, IN ITS INHERENT DIS-
CRETION. PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT 
THE UPLAND SALE, AS OFFERED BY AP-
PELLANT WAS INADMISSIBLE. 
The Appellant next argues in Point IV of its Brief 
that Judge Elton erred in rejecting the 1961 sale of the 
Upland Hotel in determining value of the subject property. 
County counsel first brought out the sale and sale price 
before the jury on cross-examination of Respondents' ex-
µert. The sale was thereafter stricken as comparable on 
R..,spondents' motion. And Judge Elton later ruled against 
the admission of the sale when offered by the County 
through its witness, Jensen. The reason for the rulings of 
.furlg-e Elton on the Upland transaction is clear in the rec-
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ord ... the sale u•as from Tracy Collins Bank to Traty 
Collins Bank, as Trustee for others. It was not an arms. 
length, open-handed transaction between an independent 
buyer and seller, each acting for his own interest in the 
ordinary s'ense. At least, there was no testimony what.so. 
ever to so indicate. 
The trial judge has wide discretion in ruling on the 
admissibility of an alleged comparable sale in eminent do-
main, Weber Basin Conserv. Dist. v. Ward, 10 U. 2d 29, 347 
P. 2d 862 (1959), and that discretion will not be overturned 
on appeal unless it is manifestly shown to have been clearly 
abused. State Rood Comm. v. Peterson, supra, State v. 
Peek, supra. 
This Court, perhaps as well if not better than any in 
the country, has spelled out the conditions required of a 
party in proffering a claimed sale in evidence. State v. 
Peek, supra, Southern Pac. Co. v. Arthur, 10 U. 2d 306. 
352 P. 2d 693 (1960), Weber Basin Conserv. Dist. v. Ward, 
supra, State Road Comm. v. Peterson, supra, State Road 
Comm. v. Woolley, 15 U. 2d 248, 390 P. 2d 860 (1964), 
State Road Comm. v. Jacobs, et al., 16 U. 2d 167 397 P. 2d 
463 ( 1964). One of those conditions is that the proffered 
sale meets the typical standards of the market value defini· 
tion, i. e., that of the willing buyer and seller in an arms· 
length and open market transaction. State Road Comm. v. 
Peterson, supra. A sale from one to himself, even acting as 
trustee for others, is a misfit in such definition, unless 
there is otherwise proof of typical conditions underlying 
the sale. No offer of proof was made by the County as to 
c,n1mu;f11n1·('s of Vvland. 
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The County claims in its Brief that the Upland transac-
tion was offered to show (1) direct comparability and (2) 
as a basis for the gross income multiplier method of Jens en. 
App. Br. p. 30. The latter is a patent misrepresentation of 
the record of trial. No such proffer was ever made by Ap-
prllant. Nor did Appellant offer to show the conditions anJ 
circumstances of the Upland deal which would begin to in-
dicate that such transaction was conducted at arms-length 
and under normal competitive negotiations in an open 
market. The burden of making that offer of proof and of 
making· it clearly, is squarely on Appellant's counsel under 
the holding of this Court in State Road Comm. v. Woolley, 
suµra. 
The balance of Appellant's challenge in its Brief of 
the ruling on UplanJ are unwovthy of comment. Judge 
Elton, in his discretion, properly rejected the evidence. 
POINT VI. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN RE-
JECTING THE TESTIMONY OF KIEPE AND 
MCEWAN OFFERED BY APPELLANT. 
1. As to K ieµe. 
There is no unce1-tainty as to W. Kiepe's testimony. It 
wa . ., and is that he did not appraise the Colonial Hotel 
Jirtlpert.v or any part thereof. But because he did appraise 
other property in the Salt Palace complex, Appellant at-
tPrnptPd to elicit Kiepe's opinion on the value of the physi-
cal land, alone, of the condemned prope1ty, without the 
l1uildi11g·. Upon objection and sustaining ruling, no offer 
11 r11·"()r w;\s m:-irle as to what Appellant claimed for such 
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opinion or what Kiepe's opinion would be. The absence oi 
such proffer alone, is dispositive of the whole question in 
this appeal since this Court and counsel have no knowledge 
as to what that testimony might have been. State Road 
Comm. v. Taggart, 19 U. 2d 247, 430 P. 2d 167 (1967); 
State Road Comm. v. Woolley, supra. 
But in any event, (even if there had been a proffer) 
a witness may not in eminent domain, legally appraise as 
ultimate opinion the value of any part of the condemned 
property, without also appraising the other parts. He may 
in explaining his opinion and appraisal methodology of the 
entire property, allocate certain values to the land and cer· 
tain values to the building or improvements, but he may 
not, as Kiepe attempted to do here, appraise less than all 
of the property. What effect does the existence of the 
building have upon the underlying land? Is the building a 
detriment or enhancement to the land value? Is the high· 
est and best use of the land inconsistent or compatible with 
the existence of the building? Is the appraiser entitled to 
appraise only that which he chooses of the property? All 
of these questions must go unanswered when a witness 
poses to testify as to only part of the condemned property. 
And so the "unit rule of evaluation" has been adopted 
without respectable dissent, by the overwhelming decision 
in this country." 27 Am. Jur. 2d 94, Eminent Domain §291; 
City of Los Angeles v. Klinker, 219 Cal. 198, 25 P. 2d 826. 
The holding in Khnker was under a compensation statute 
11County counsel claims in his Brief, p. 35, that he is unable to find 
case precedent on the legal prohibition of appraising only the physi· 
cal land of an improved property. For openers, we refer him to 
better than 110 citations in 1 A. L. R. 2d 878 and Supplements. 
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identical to that in Utah, 78-34-10(1) U.C.A. 1953. This 
Court is in full accord with the enforcement of the unit 
rule of evaluation. State Road Comm. v. Papanikolas, 19 
U. 2d 153, 427 P. 2d 749 (1967). 
Kiepe's testimony was introduced by Appellant as sub-
stantive opinion of market value of the condemned prop-
e1ty. It is a ruse to classify it as "rebuttal or corroborat-
ing", as labeled by Appellant in its Brief. Even at that, ilt 
,,·ould be inadmissible in law and Judge Elton so ruled. 
2. As to McEwan. 
The fireman, McEwan, did not see the Hotel untH 
more than a month after the date of value herein and then 
at a time when the property was being dismantled for the 
Salt Palace. On objection, the Court ruled that the evidence 
was not material to any issue before the Court. Appellant's 
counsel made no offer of proof as to what, if anything 
McEwan might say, which faot precludes raising the ques-
tion on appeal. Rasmussen v. Davis, 1 U. 2d 96, 262 P. 2d 
4:-i8 (1953). 
The only relevant date in the case is the date of ser-
vice of Summons in establishing market value. 78-34-11 
U.C.A. 1953. State Road Comm. v. Bettilyon, Inc., 17 U. 2d 
13'1, 405 P. 2d 420 ( 1965). If there was a substantial 
change in the premises after the date of value, testimony 
!'elating to such change is of no materiality. State Road 
C11111111. v. Valentine, 10 U. 2d 132, 349 P. 2d 321 (1960). 




THE CLOSING ARGUMENT OF COUNTY 
COUNSEL WAS AN ATTEMPT TO PREJU-
DICE A FAIR TRIAL OF THE CASE. 
While Appellant does not indicate in its Brief the na-
ture of the verdict or even its amount, or how it was preju· 
diced by the evidence of trial, it is probably a safe assump-
tion that its basic complaint is with the amount of the ver· 
diet. That being the gravamen of its appeal, it may well 
be that the remarks of Appellant's counsel in his closing 
summation may have contributed to the result it now pro-
tests. Exceeding all fair bounds of propriety, fair play, 
anJ the evidence, County counsel, in his argument, accused 
Respondents' counsel of manufacturing testimony of un· 
qualified witnesses, attacked the personal honesty and in-
tegrity of the landowners, accused Respondents of trying 
to pull-off a swindle before an "inexperienced jury" and 
of trying to "steal" from the jury, who also were taxpaying 
citizens of Appellant-County: 
"MR. NIELSON: And you heard Mr. Camp· 
bell cross examine Max Jensen on the figure that 
he used and how did he have those figures. It's be-
cause the landowner haJ those figures and that 
price ever since the appraisal was first done. Now, 
notice what was the effect of that. That means the 
landowner can come into this Courtroom and say to 
you the pl'operty's worth something diffe1ent? He 
can say that it't' worth more money without anY 
risk of ta!cinr1 less money. * * * He's got 
everything to gain and nothing to lose. Now, how 
is he going to gain? What is he going to gain? 
First, he hires an <ippraiser and can he hire an 
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M.A./. for this purpose? No. He has to hire an 
appraiser without a professional -
"MR. CAMPBELL: Object to this, if the Court 
please. 
"THE COURT: Yes. We are reaching a point 
here, Mr. Nielson, that the ladies and gentlemen of 
the jury, it makes no difference as to what the 
negatiations have been in regard to this property 
prior to the matters that have been heard in evi-
dence in this case. This makes no difference what-
soever. 
"MR. NIELSON: Now, he gets assistance, ser-
vice of an appraiser and then he tells the appraiser 
the basis of the information that the appraiser 
makes the estimate on. * * * Then they get a 
nP1c and inexperienced jury and project that infor-
mation to that jury -
"MR. CAMPBELL: I think that we're gtrtting 
into a very serious problem in this case, and I ask 
that that statement be stricken. That is -
"THE COURT: Yes. I don't know - I don't 
know the problem about whether a jury is inexper-
ienced or experienced. I would suspect that any 
jury we have here has to be an inexperienced jury, 
because we demand that they know nothing about 
the matter, Mr. Nielson. I don't understand any 
reference to experience or an inexperienced jury. 
* * * You may proceed, I'm going to suggest 
to ,1.·ou that you avoid that type of comment. 
"lVIR. NIELSON: By this process, ladies and 
!!entlemen, f}zp land01cnPrs are trying to induce you 
to .<Jil'e thr:m more money than they're entitled to 
for this prnpel'ty. They're trying to steal from you 
b,1.r ove1·stating the value of their property; by say-
ing that it's worth something a great deal more 
th:rn they hm·e said th:1t it was worth in the market 
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place for twenty-five years. When I tell my Board, 
my clients, that what this case is about, they can't 
believe that after -
"MR. CAMPBELL: I can't ~lieve this either, 
your Honor. 
"THE COURT: Mr. Nielson -
"MR. CAMPBELL: This is impossible, your 
Honor. 
"THE COURT: Wha;t difference has any 
problems that you have with your client got to do 
with your argument? * * * I am going to 
again ask you to avoid and let's stay to the evidence 
in this case, and what reference you do have, what 
remarks you want to make about the credibility of 
witnesses, * * * I will anticipate that your re-
maining argument will be addressed to those mat· 
ters. '1' * * Sir, you may go ahead. 
"MR. NIELSON: This is just a means of pro-
jecting my argument, Your Honor. 
"THE COURT: Well, I am just suggesting 
that you are getting out of the area of a proper 
summation. Go ahead" (R. 810-813). 
That such argument would have been substantially 
prejudicial if an appeal had been taken by Respondents in 
this case, is not subject to reasonable debate. Garden Grove 
School Dist. of Orange County v. Hendler, 45 Cal. Rptr. 
313, 403 P. 2d 721 (1965), State Road Comm. v. Marriott, 
444 P. 2d 56 (Utah 1968). But it could be that the trier 
of fact in this case found such diatribe of Appellant as 
offensive to common fairness as did the Trial Court 




The verdict and judgment of the trial court are mani-
festly supported by competent evidence and in any event, 
by the cost replacement approach to market value used by 
witnesses for both sides. The capitalization approach of 
Respondents and, for that matter, of the Appellant was 
i::ompetent and admissible under the controlling case law, 
and it was for the jury to weigh the credibility of the evi-
dence. The rulings of Judge Elton on the cross-examina-
Lion of Jensen as to the basis of his taxes in the income 
approach, on the consideration by Respondents' expert of 
Church sales, on the admissibility of the Upland sale, and 
on the testimony of Kiepe and McEwan, were properly 
wnceived and made without error. 
The verdict was a fair compromise and result, re-
turned on the second trial after seven days of hearing. 
Appellant has failed to show any error or prejudice, or 
either, in the trial. Accordingly, the judgment entered 
>;hould be affirmed, it is respectfuHy submitted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. 
STEW ART M. HANSON, JR. 
520 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondents 
